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2 Conjectural variations and market equilibrium
In this section market equilibrium is analyzed under the hypothesis that each
variety is produced by a mono-product rm, which competes with both the
other producers within its own group, and the producers belonging to other
groups. In particular, we assume that there are ni mono-product rms for each
group i of products (i = 1; :::;M), and that each of them produces a brand
(indexed with j = 1; :::; ni) of the i-th group.
Since there are ni varieties per group, each rm simultaneously faces two dif-
ferent competitive environments. Horizontally, each rm competes with others
producing imperfect substitutes of degree  at the inter-group level. At the
intra-group level, however, it competes with other rms producing imperfect
substitutes with degree of substitutability  6 . Therefore, there is an inter-
group competition between rms of di¤erent groups, and an intra-group com-
petition within the same group. We assume that prices are the rmsstrategic
variable.
The j-th mono-product rm (j 2 [1; ni]), of the i-th group (i 2 [1;M ]),
produces the ij-th variety according to a linear technology. Hence for the
ij-th rm, the cost function is C(xij) = cxij, where c is the constant marginal
cost. Throughout the analysis, we normalize it to one (i.e. c = 1). Each rm
sets its own price in order to maximize prots:
ij = xij(pij)pij   xij(pij) (17)
The rst order condition for prot maximization can be written in terms of
the Lerner index of monopoly power:
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= fxij ;pij is the demand price elasticity as perceived by the
ij-th rm 7 :
fxij ;pij =  + (   )ij + (1  )ij (19)
In the elasticity formula, ij and ij measure, respectively, the e¤ects of the
ij-th price variation on the own group price-index (group price-index-e¤ect)
and on the industry price-index (industry price-index-e¤ect). The rst is given
by ij =
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6 In particular, intra-group competition could be involved di¤erences in quality, so
that intra-group competition may turn to vertical product di¤erentiation.
7 Notice the di¤erence between demand elasticity in (14) and demand elasticity as
perceived by rms.
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Clearly, the rms demand elasticity a¤ects its market power, being related
to the competitive environment perceived by rms. In particular, di¤erent
market structures can be seen as the outcome of di¤erent assumptions about
the impact of each rms price decision on the rivalsbehavior. Consider the
e¤ect of changing of pij both on qi (i.e. ij) and on q (i.e. ij). If ij = 0 and
ij = 0, then the rms price decisions have no e¤ect respectively at the group
and at the industry level; on the contrary, ij = 1 and ij = 1 denote full
e¤ects 8 . When the individual price decision inuences the group price-index,
an oligopolistic intra-group competition arises 9 . Di¤erently, the intra-group
competition is monopolistic when the rms price decisions are negligible and
they do not inuence the group price-index.
Moreover, the perceived e¤ect on q synthesizes the nature of competition at
the inter-group level. When the e¤ect is not negligible, inter-group competition
is oligopolistic; while inter-group monopolistic competition arises when such
e¤ect is neglected 10 .
2.1 The perceived market structure
In the standard monopolistic competition literature, the attention has often
been focused on markets where the existence of a large number of operating
rms implies that each individual decision is negligible in the previous sense.
In particular the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model has been used to examine a wide
range of issues.
However, the assumption of competitive behavior is independent of the num-
ber of agents in the market 11 : as long as the agents behave competitively,
the competitive equilibrium can be solved for any number of rms. The idea
that the competitive behavior and the negligibility assumption are related
to the existence of a large number of sellers, depends on two main reasons.
First, price-index-taking behavior seems more reasonable when the number
of rms is large; second, the equilibrium in non-competitive market struc-
tures converges to the competitive one when the number of rms increases.
Nevertheless, the denition of market structure is indeed independent of the
number of rms. Rather, the specic environment faced by rms is closely
related to the beliefs, the conjectures, about the rivalsreactions (Bresnahan
8 The admitted ranges are: 0  ij  1 and 0  ij  1.
9 Di Cintio (2005) studies a similar industry stucture, where each group is composed
by homogeneous products.
10 Reasonably, if rms neglect the e¤ect on qi they cannot take into account the
e¤ect on q.
11 In frameworks of product di¤erentiation, the term competitive is obviously refered
to monopolistic competitive behavior.
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(1981), Kamien-Schwartz (1983), Perry (1982)).
As a useful starting point, we rst reinterpret the well-known market outcomes
(commonly analyzed in the literature) in terms of conjectural variations. In
this model two conjectural variations are considered. The rst is the intra-
group conjectural derivative: @pik
@pij
= ijik (8i and 8k 6= j), which measures
what the typical ij-th rm believes about the relationship between its own
price variation and the price change of rivals of the same group. The second is
the inter-group conjecture @phk
@pij
= ijhk (8h 6= i and 8k), which measures what
the typical ij-th rm believes about the relationship between its own price
change and the reaction of rivals of any other group.
For ik = 0 and hk = 0, we are in the standard Bertrand case: each rm
expects that if it changes its price, the rivals will not change theirs. In this
model we also allow for non-zero conjectures. In particular, negative conjec-
tures mean that each rm believes that the rivals will react to a price increase
through a reduction of their prices; while positive conjectures mean that rivals
will react in the same direction of the ij-th price change.
Taking into account the above denitions, we may express the e¤ect (of a
change in the ij-th price) on the group and industry price indices, in terms of
the conjectural variations  and :
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By making use of conjectural variations, we allow for the dependence of market
structure on the beliefs of agents, thus mitigating the predictive power of those
theories which link the structure of the market to the number of active rms.
Any market structure is therefore conceivable for any given number of rms,
and di¤erent competitive environments may result.
From equations (18) and (19), we can derive the general solution of the model
for the equilibrium price, quantity and prots, under generic conjectures:
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If we conne our attention to the symmetric equilibrium with the same number
of products in each group (ni = n), we have that all pij = p 8i; j,  = 1+(n 1)n
and  = 1+(n 1)+n(M 1)
Mn
.
In the limit, if  = 1 ( = 1) and  = 1 ( = 1) 12 each rm expects
that its own price change will be followed exactly by rivals; this means that
in the market a perfect coordination of decisions is achieved (full intra- and
inter-coordination).
When  = 1 ( = 1) and   1
M 1 <  < 1 (0 <  < 1) we have some
kind of inter-group oligopolistic competition, while rms of the same group
behave cooperatively in order to maximize the prots of the group (intra-group
coordination).
For  =   1
n 1 ( = 0)
13 each rm believes that its price variation will be
o¤set by a price reduction of all its rivals in the same group, aimed at main-
taining the group price index constant. But if a rm may not a¤ect the group
price-index, it is reasonable to assume that it cannot inuence the industry
price-index (i.e. if  = 0 then  = 0), thus we have both intra-group and
inter-group monopolistic competition.
For all  such that   1
n 1 <  < 1 (0 <  < 1), each rm enjoys some
kind of market power within its own group; therefore if at the inter-group
level  =  1+(n 1)
n(M 1)
14 (so that  = 0), we obtain intra-group oligopolistic
competition and inter-group monopolistic competition.
Obviously, the standard Bertrand competition arises for  = 0 (0 <

 = 1
n

<
1) and  = 0 (0 <

 = 1
Mn

< 1). Lastly, all other values of  and , for
which still 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1 15 , allow for unusual intra- and
inter-group oligopolistic competition.
Summing up, each rm may perceive the own price change as relevant or
not with respect to the group price-index and it may preserve some degree
of market power at the group perspective. However, when rms of di¤erent
groups react in order to maintain the industry sales unchanged, an individual
price change does not a¤ect the industry price-index q (i.e.  = 0) and, as a
consequence, we have an inter-group monopolistic competition 16 .
12  = 1 and  = 1 are the upper limits of both conjectures.
13 The lower limit for .
14 The lower limit for .
15 That is   1n 1 <  < 1 and  1+(n 1)n(M 1) <  < MM 1   1+(n 1)n(M 1) .
16 In this case, elasticity in (19) yields: fxij ;pij = + (  ) pijq1 i
"
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In the following table we conne our attention to situations of inter-group
monopolistic competition, allowing for di¤erent values of , i.e. for di¤erent
intra-group competitive environments. Prices, quantities and prots are then
evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium.
 =   1
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where superscript denotes respectively Monopolistic competition, Oligopolistic
competition and Coordinated behavior at the intra-group level. As expected,
under all possible conjectures, prots are decreasing in the number of varieties
and in the elasticities of substitutions (, , or both).
However, if we allow for inter-group oligopolistic competition, i.e. if we allow
for strategic interaction both at the intra-group and at the inter-group level,
we have to consider the price-index e¤ect on both price indices qi and q. In
this case, for any  1+(n 1)
n(M 1) <   1, rmsmarket power arises both within
groups and in the entire market 17 .
In this case of inter-group oligopolistic competition (i.e. for 0 <   1), if
0 <   1 we have the following expressions for the symmetric equilibrium
prices, quantities and prots in terms of  and :
p M [(1 )[+(n 1)]+n]+(1 )[1+(n 1)+(M 1)]
M [(1 )[+(n 1)]+n( 1)]+(1 )[1+(n 1)+(M 1)]
x Y
Mn
M [(1 )[+(n 1)]+n( 1)]+(1 )[1+(n 1)+(M 1)]
M [(1 )[+(n 1)]+n]+(1 )[1+(n 1)+(M 1)]
 Y
M [(1 )[+(n 1)]+n]+(1 )[1+(n 1)+(M 1)]
Under Bertrand behavior ( = 0;  = 0) we have  = 1
n
and  = 1
Mn
,
while full coordination arises for  = 1 and  = 1. In this latter case rms
choices have a full e¤ect on the market ( = 1 and  = 1) and the perfect
coordination between all rms allows them to extract the total consumers
surplus.
17 In this case, elasticity in (19) yields: fxij ;pij = +
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The following table summarizes the equilibrium prots for specic values of 
and :
 =  1+(n 1)
n(M 1) ,   1n 1 <  < 1  = 0,  = 0  = 1,  = 1
Mc = Y
M
1
+( )(1+(n 1)) 
Bc = Y
(1 )+M [+(n 1)] 
PC = Y
Mn
where again superscripts denote respectively Monopolistic competition, Bertrand
Competition and Perfect Coordinated behavior.
3 The multiproduct rms
The literature on multiproduct rms has mainly focused on the incentive to
create brands portfolios as opposed to mono-product strategies. Indeed, the
production of an entire product line may be a powerful tool to deter entry and
to escape from a too much intense competition (Schmalensee, 1978).
However, the literature has paid a relatively little attention to the optimal
price policies of large companies selling an entire product line; moreover, it
has not provided a full motivation of two alternative organizational structures:
there are companies which directly control prices from the above and compa-
nies which delegate the price decisions to independent PMs. Many papers
on mergers have shown that it is protable to allow for independent divi-
sions when the capacity constraints play a fundamental role, such as in the
cigarette market and in the automobile industry, while it is better to control
each decision centrally under price competition - examples being the fast-food
and mineral water industries. In the fast-food industry, all customers of the
Mac-Donald and Burger King groups know that prices are dened centrally
and that no autonomy is left to the single division (store). On the contrary,
Williamson (1975) and Milgrom-Roberts (1992) have stressed the importance
of giving independence to product divisions of the same company. There is sig-
nicant evidence that Philip Morris tobacco, General Motors, Fiat, and Ford
encourage competition across their own divisions, and that the same applies
to Procter-&-Gamble and Mitsubishi (Nikkei Weekly 1994), to the rms of the
cosmetics sector (Low 1994) and to those o¤ering high-tech services (Forbes
1992).
Whether and when a system of PMs decentralized decisions is better than
a mechanism with a centralized GD is not a trivial question. The analyti-
cal framework developed in this paper may provide an adequate tool to deal
with this problem on the basis of a key distinction: the protability of one or
the other organizational structure may depend on the characteristics of the
multiproduct rms product line: market segmentation or market interlacing.
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